I am not suggesting that it is suddenly going to turn into a strong state or a model democracy, but I think the minimum is there to keep it somehow surviving, and I think a lot depends on the policies of the government, especially giving the south some sense that staying is in their interest. Also, though Yemenis have fought a civil war and there is fighting between north and south, Yemenis are not accustomed to internal violence. They were shocked by the fighting and the bloodshed of the transition, with the army turning its guns on people.
I think that shocked people a great deal, and I think there is an element of that that keeps Yemenis talking. They do not want to go back to that kind of situation. AK: I am struck by the work of the political scientist Dankwart Rustow, who said that the requisite for democracy is identity. RB: I would say that Yemenis, as opposed to Gulfis or Saudis, do have a particular identity, but that it is based more in differences than in synergies.
The odds of them being able to co-exist in a loose autonomous federation—similar to a Lebanon system—may be feasible. But such a loose confederation also complicates the situation.
The big issue is oil, because most of the oil is in the south or in Jawf, and in those areas the people are diametrically opposed to the Sana-based Yemeni political structure. The south, with its smaller population and its oil production, might be able to create a state that looks something Oman, but with a weaker central authority. DN: I think that autonomy has to happen. AK: Yemen is doing moderately well compared to the other transition states.
In Tunisia, the record is not bad, but like Yemen, Tunisia is going through a testing period. Yemen has never had that. It is so diffuse, so fragmented that an authoritarian state has never existed. That is dramatically different from the other Arab republics of the region, with perhaps the exception of Lebanon. DN: I think another point worth making is that the north-south differences are essentially cultural differences, not religious differences.
There is a good book on this subject by Bernard Haykel regarding the Zaydi imams in the Middle Ages; Haykel notes that the medieval Rasulid rulers constantly downplayed the difference between Zaydism and Shafism. Religious judges are now trained in both schools of law. There has always been a degree of religious tolerance, and so now it really is the cultural differences between the north and the south that are most evident.
The high degree of corruption the north introduced into the south has exacerbated the problem. RB: I would like to ask David a question.
But when we look at the north, we look, for example, at Sada and we look at the so-called Houthi Zaydis. Sada has always been relatively autonomous. Do you see areas like Jawf and Sada with a kind of autonomy that parallels what you see for the south?
DN: I think that there should be a degree of autonomy in Sada because the differences are so great, but not to the degree of the formal autonomy that might be given to the south.
DN: In the north there are those differences, but the situation is much more complicated. It goes beyond Sada. The differences have been increased, to a degree, by the Saudi-promoted fundamentalism in the north.
The Zaydis now fear that they may not survive, as they have no imam and little power, and the fundamentalists are growing stronger. Hence the problems are more complex. AK: I think that is an excellent summary of your position. Roby, could you give us a two-line summary of where you stand on the prospects? RB: I think that the trajectory in Yemen, just like the trajectory in Syria and Iraq, in Libya and in Lebanon, is toward fragmentation and regionalization of control and resources.
So I see the NDC as providing the basis for separating even further. Secondarily there are important but tactical security interests. AQAP is a serious security problem, but not in and of itself a strategic, existential threat to the United States or the global economy, and it should not be treated as one. You could make the point that AQAP destabilizing Yemen could cause a big Saudi problem, but I think that even that threat would be exaggerated.
Yet nearly all of these groups possess enough men and munitions to act as a spoiler to any national peace deal they feel does not adequately address their interests. More concerning still is the fact that the longer the fighting continues, the more armed groups are likely to emerge. Combine that with the fact that Yemen has a shrinking economic pie — exports are largely limited to the oil and gas fields in Marib, Shabwa, and Hadramawt — and the recipe is in place for years of conflict to come.
In the future, more and more groups will be fighting over fewer and fewer resources. This is already on display in Marib. The Houthis know that in order to survive as an independent state in the highlands they will need export revenue. None of the various peace efforts — whether the U. The Houthis do not want to be part of a state; they want to be the state.
They are not about to give up at the bargaining table what they believe they have won on the battlefield. Even if the Houthis and the STC were willing to negotiate to be part of a restructured Yemeni state, there is no guarantee that, at this late date, the state could actually be put back together.
The U. But for a variety of reasons, from counterterrorism to humanitarian and refugee concerns to Red Sea shipping lanes, the U. The nation-state system is the key building block of diplomacy, international relations, and national security.
Since then President Saleh's party, the General People's Congress, has come to dominate the political scene. The next parliamentary elections, which were due in , have been postponed twice. In , Saleh was directly elected as president for the first time. He competed against an obscure member of his own party, paid his opponent's election expenses, and won with Chewing starts after lunch, with men and women in separate rooms.
Leaves are plucked and gently crushed between the teeth until a wad builds up in the cheek. It's a social activity and chewers' conversation often centres on politics. Qat is a stimulant, so chewers without religious scruples often wash it down with whisky in order to sleep.
Tribes apply their own traditional law 'urf and some have militias capable of keeping the national army at bay. Large numbers of civilians are armed - Yemen is said to have three times as many guns as people - and from time to time the government launches a crackdown. Jambiyyas are unsheathed and brandished above the head when dancing. Both are influential in politics. Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, the supreme chief of the Hashid, who died in , was also speaker of the Yemeni parliament and leader of the Islah opposition party.
President Saleh belongs to the Sanhan tribe, part of the Hashid federation. Its most important members are the Yemeni Congregation for Reform or Islah which has Islamist and traditionalist wings, and the Yemen Socialist party which ruled the south before unification with the north.
The most recent outbreak occurred in August when the government launched Operation Scorched Earth.
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